Connect with us

World Affairs

How the US-Israel war on Iran is affecting African economies

I spoke to Dr. Zainab Usman, senior research scholar at the Centre on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University, about how the war and its blockades are affecting some African countries.

Published

on

‘Hurtful to households and businesses’ … the risk to global supply chains for Africans is nuanced. Illustration: Joe Plimmer/Guardian Pictures/Alamy/AFP/Getty © Illustration: Joe Plimmer/Guardian Pictures/Alamy/AFP/Getty

It remains a confusing situation, but the strait of Hormuz now appears to have been closed twice. Once by Iran, and then by the US, which this week announced a blockade of its own on the reduced number of ships using Iranian ports. Higher fuel and energy costs for ordinary people across the world are the headlines, but as the war on Iran enters its sixth week, shipping restrictions and strikes on energy facilities in Gulf countries are affecting some of the poorest and most vulnerable economies in the world in more profound ways.

I spoke to Dr. Zainab Usman, senior research scholar at the Centre on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University, about how the war and its blockades are affecting some African countries.

A global shock

“It’s very important”, Dr Usman stresses, “to understand that while the obstruction of shipping has affected the entire world, that particular choke point” in the Middle East, “accounts for 20% of the world’s shipment of crude oil, and a good chunk of that goes to Asia and parts of east Africa.” And so, it is countries closer to the strait and the Indian Ocean that have been affected the most. Ethiopia, Kenya, Egypt, and some parts of southern Africa, are already experiencing fuel shortages. Countries facing the Atlantic Ocean on the west coast of Africa have not suffered from similar supply disruptions. However, a hike in fuel prices is landing across the continent. Costs have risen, Dr Usman told me, anywhere between 30 and 70%, and at the most extreme end, up to 150% in Somalia.

But there is another distinction that means the impact of the war is more severe for some.

Oil importers hit hardest

“I would divide African countries broadly into two categories”, Dr Usman said. “One would be oil-importing countries in the east and some parts of north and southern Africa. And then those that are oil-producing countries,” such as Nigeria, Angola, Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville. The former import all the oil they consume, and are doubly affected if their supplies come through the Gulf. Egypt, for example, has already passed energy saving measures reducing street lighting, and passed a decree stipulating that shops, restaurants, shopping centres, cinemas, theatres, and wedding halls shut down at 9pm to save electricity.

But oil-exporting countries, Dr Usman said, are “still not immune from the crisis”. They are being affected not through supply shortages, but the general global hike in fuel prices brought about by the political shock from events in the Middle East. Nigeria has one of the largest oil refineries in the world but people are still paying more for fuel. “The interesting thing about rising energy costs around the world is they have inflationary impacts,” Dr Usman said. Energy is needed for daily activities: for electricity, for fuel for your car. In the immediate term, “the impact is quite hurtful to households, businesses, and the budgets of governments”.

A food crisis is not inevitable

There is a tendency, she tells me, that where poorer countries are concerned, to catastrophise. There is a global shock and immediately people “start projecting disaster, famine, hunger. We did this during the early days of the war in Ukraine. There were challenges in getting certain oils and grains, but projections of widespread hunger did not pan out. There are nuances to take into account”. (This point reminds me of how the Covid-19 pandemic was less deadly in Africa than anticipated, and in fact, less severe compared to places with more advanced health systems).

The strait handles the shipment of supplies for commodities beyond oil and fuels, with fertiliser among the key resources passing through the shipping lane. But the impact of fertiliser shortages on Africa is, at the moment, overestimated, Dr Usman said. “Unlike the immediate impact of reduction of fuel supplies, the use of fertiliser is seasonal and just because there’s a disruption now doesn’t mean that farming and harvesting and output is affected. A lot of poor countries in Africa and elsewhere tend to have economies that are heavily agricultural”, and so “they do take storage seriously”. Even if this conflict becomes prolonged, some countries will be able to tap into the supplies they have stored. “I would be cautious,” Dr Usman said, in projecting food insecurity.

Rising risks and opportunities

“If this conflict becomes prolonged, then we are looking at deeper impacts on African economies,” Dr Usman said. One would be that governments will start thinking about cushioning the higher prices across the board that arise from higher energy costs, and so would raise subsidies. “Subsidies are quite expensive and would put a strain on budgets,” Dr Usman said.

If the conflict continues we could begin to see a disruption in supplies, even in countries that are oil-rich. “You have to remember that some of these countries don’t have sufficient refining capacity to convert the crude oil they extract into the refined products used daily. They will then have to supplement their domestic production with imports. That is the case in quite a number of countries in west and central Africa.”

But there is a third, longer-term implication that is not necessarily a negative. “Many countries now realise that energy security should be top of mind for them. Before this crisis, energy policy was mostly around how do we make electricity affordable, reliable, accessible, with energy procured from clean sources that do not add to greenhouse gas emissions. Now, many policymakers, are rightly in my view, going to focus on energy security that looks beyond developmental goals. We have to think in realpolitik terms – how do we ensure vulnerability to external shocks and things we cannot control.” This may mean an orientation towards African countries “harnessing their own domestic resources”, and investing in their regional refining and processing capacity.

Hostages to peace

But a final implication still lurks in the background. If the conflict and shipping constraints continue, stores of fertiliser run out, and the farming season is afoot, there is risk of weaker harvests and poor availability of food.

But “we are not there yet”, Dr Usman said. Which is an apt summary of how the Middle East crisis is splitting those it affects into two – those for whom the impact has already arrived, and those who are not there yet, hostage to a de-escalation that is always imminent, but never seems to arrive.

__

Nesrine Malik is a Guardian columnist and the author of We Need New Stories: Challenging the Toxic Myths Behind Our Age of Discontent

Facebook Comments Box

The Diblomaasi Times is a leading website in Somalia for foreign policy analysis, security, independent and agenda-setting news, political analysis and opinion commentary specifically written/prepared for the new generation.

Advertisement
Click to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

World Affairs

How Contemporary Global Dynamics Exacerbate Challenges in Underdeveloped States: The Case of Somalia

Somalia illustrates how global dynamics can reinforce structural constraints in underdeveloped countries.

Published

on


This paper examines how current global dynamics — including geopolitical rivalry, economic coercion, and fragmentation of the international order — can create or intensify structural challenges faced by underdeveloped countries, using Somalia as a representative case.

In the current international system, major powers increasingly prioritize strategic competition over cooperative development, often turning fragile states into arenas for proxy influence. For Somalia, geopolitical rivalry in the Horn of Africa has resulted in external interventions driven more by security and strategic interests than by long-term state-building or inclusive development. This has weakened domestic institutions and undermined national sovereignty, perpetuating political instability.

Economic coercion and unequal global economic relations further exacerbate Somalia’s structural vulnerabilities. As an underdeveloped country with limited bargaining power, Somalia remains heavily dependent on foreign aid, remittances, and external markets. Conditional aid, sanctions, and donor-driven agendas can constrain policy autonomy, preventing the government from pursuing development strategies tailored to local needs. Additionally, global economic shocks—such as rising food prices, supply chain disruptions, and fluctuations in foreign assistance—disproportionately affect Somalia, intensifying poverty, food insecurity, and unemployment.

1. Economic Fragmentation and Vulnerability

The weaponisation of trade, finance, and sanctions by major powers has increased volatility in global markets. Prices for essential goods such as food, fuel, and fertiliser fluctuate sharply during periods of geopolitical tension.

For import-dependent countries like Somalia, these shocks translate directly into inflation, shortages, and heightened food insecurity. At the same time, donor states increasingly redirect resources towards domestic priorities and security spending, placing additional pressure on aid budgets.

As Somalia spends a disproportionately high share of national income on basic imports, even minor disruptions in global supply chains have severe domestic consequences.

2. Erosion of Multilateral Safety Nets

The weakening of the post-war multilateral system has reduced the effectiveness of institutions such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and international development banks. As cooperation declines, funding for peacekeeping, mediation, and long-term development becomes less predictable. Crisis management increasingly replaces sustained development planning.

For Somalia, this erosion results in inconsistent aid flows, reduced diplomatic engagement, and slower progress in state-building and institutional consolidation.

3. Geopolitical Rivalry and Proxy Conflict

In a fragmented international environment, powerful states often pursue influence through indirect means, supporting local actors rather than engaging through cooperative development frameworks.

Fragile states such as Somalia become arenas for proxy competition rather than equal partners. Pre-existing internal divisions, weak institutions, and the presence of armed groups make Somalia particularly susceptible to external interference.

The spillover of regional rivalries prolongs instability, undermines governance, and weakens prospects for lasting peace.

4. Retreat of Private Investment

Periods of global uncertainty encourage investors to favour stable, low-risk markets. Fragile and conflict-affected states are increasingly viewed as unattractive destinations without strong international guarantees. As private investment declines, job creation slows and youth unemployment rises. In such environments, economic marginalisation can make recruitment by extremist or criminal networks easier.

This dynamic reinforces a cycle in which insecurity deters investment, and lack of investment deepens insecurity.

5. Climate Fragmentation and Adaptation Gaps

Global political fragmentation has slowed collective action on climate change, particularly with regard to financing adaptation in vulnerable regions. For Somalia, delayed investment in water management, agriculture, and climate-resilient infrastructure has immediate consequences. Recurrent droughts and floods undermine food security, drive displacement, and intensify competition over land and resources.

Climate stress therefore acts as a direct multiplier of conflict and humanitarian need.

6. Inward Turn of Middle Powers

As states pursue strategic autonomy and national resilience, development assistance increasingly becomes transactional. Aid is more frequently tied to migration control or security objectives rather than long-term development outcomes. This shift risks distorting Somalia’s domestic priorities away from institution-building, education, healthcare, and sustainable economic reform.

Over time, such conditionality can weaken national ownership of development strategies.

The Combined Effect: A Development Trap

These pressures interact and reinforce one another. Weak governance reduces aid and investment; declining investment deepens poverty and instability; instability then invites neglect or exploitation in the geopolitical arena. Somalia’s challenges are therefore not solely the result of internal failure. They are shaped by global forces that the country neither created nor can easily influence.

Why This Matters Globally

Instability in underdeveloped countries does not remain contained. Forced migration increases, piracy and transnational crime expand, and humanitarian crises become chronic rather than resolvable. In a fragmented global order, neglecting fragile states ultimately proves more costly than supporting their development and resilience.

The fragmentation of the international order also poses significant challenges. The weakening of multilateral institutions and the decline of coordinated global responses reduce the effectiveness of peacebuilding, humanitarian assistance, and development cooperation. In Somalia’s case, fragmented international engagement has led to overlapping mandates among donors, regional organizations, and international actors, resulting in inefficiency and limited accountability. This fragmentation complicates efforts to address root causes of underdevelopment, such as weak governance, insecurity, and limited infrastructure.

Overall, Somalia illustrates how global dynamics can reinforce structural constraints in underdeveloped countries. Rather than alleviating vulnerability, geopolitical competition, economic coercion, and international fragmentation often deepen dependence and instability, highlighting the need for more inclusive, coordinated, and development-centered global engagement.

Facebook Comments Box

Continue Reading

World Affairs

Geopolitical Implications of Prime Minister Mark Carney’s Davos Speech ‘A Rupture in the World Order’

World leaders, rattled by Donald Trump’s latest gambit in Greenland, look to present a united front at the World Economic Forum.

Published

on

Prime Minister Mark Carney’s Davos Speech

The world leaders gathered for the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, this week are facing a stark and disorienting reality: The United States under President Donald Trump is no longer a reliable or predictable ally.

From wielding economy-upending tariffs like a cudgel against nearly every country in the world, to using the U.S. military to overthrow the leader of a sovereign country without bothering to seek authorization at home or abroad, to threatening to seize the territory of some oft the United States’ closest friends and allies, Trump has brazenly discarded the old rule book to pursue what he has called an “America First” agenda.

Much of the rest of the world is struggling just to keep up, let alone craft a coherent, effective response. But some leaders are beginning to find their footing. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney seems to be one such figure. In a forceful speech at Davos on Tuesday that is already being cited as a blueprint, Carney laid out his vision for how to push back against Trump’s chaos.

This article provides a region-by-region analysis of the major geopolitical implications of Prime Minister Mark Carney’s Davos speech on 20 January 2026, drawing on both the substance of his remarks and reactions from global leaders and commentators.

Implications for Canada

  1. Re-defining Canada’s foreign policy posture: Carney’s speech signals a shift away from heavy reliance on traditional U.S.-led alliances towards a more independent and diversified diplomatic and strategic orientation. He argued that the post-war U.S.-led rules-based order is eroding, and that Canada, as a middle power, must help shape a new values-based order grounded in cooperation rather than dependency.
  2. Strategic autonomy and diversification: Carney emphasised the need to reduce dependence on any single dominant partner and to deepen economic and strategic ties with a broader range of countries, including Europe, China, and other like-minded states. This aligns with Canada’s ongoing efforts to diversify trade and investment relationships.
  3. Tensions with the United States: Although President Trump was not named, the speech was widely interpreted as a critique of recent U.S. unilateralism, including tariff threats linked to the Greenland dispute. The address prompted public pushback from the U.S. presidency, with President Trump publicly admonishing Canada following the speech.
  4. Leadership among middle powers: Carney’s call for coordinated action among middle powers could position Canada as a convenor among like-minded states such as the Nordic countries, Australia, and South Korea, potentially amplifying its diplomatic influence beyond its economic weight.

Implications for the United States

  1. Challenge to U.S. leadership narratives: Carney’s assertion that the old order is unlikely to return, and his warning that economic integration can become coercive, were widely read as veiled criticism of U.S. policies that prioritise unilateral leverage over multilateral norms.
  2. Recalibration of alliances: Canada’s message reflects growing concern among U.S. allies about the sustainability of a leadership model perceived as transactional or coercive. Carney’s remarks highlight fears that overdependence on the United States may erode allied autonomy.
  3. Potential strain in U.S.–Canada relations: The public disagreement that emerged in Davos, including President Trump’s assertion that Canada should be “grateful” to the United States, underscores Canada’s increasingly assertive posture and suggests potential friction in the bilateral relationship.

Implications for Europe

  1. Alignment with European concerns: European leaders at Davos responded strongly to U.S. tariff threats and echoed Carney’s call for reinforcing or reforming the global order. French and EU officials emphasised respect for allies and adherence to rules over coercive economic measures.
  2. Opportunities for deeper cooperation: Carney’s critique of unrestrained great-power behaviour aligns with European debates on strengthening strategic autonomy while preserving transatlantic ties. His remarks may bolster arguments for a more self-reliant yet cooperative Europe.
  3. New cooperative frameworks: The emphasis on middle-power coalitions complements European priorities around values-based cooperation, potentially enabling deeper EU–Canada collaboration on trade, climate action, and security.

Implications for Asia

  1. Appeal to Asian middle powers: Carney’s call for broader middle-power cooperation implicitly includes Asian states such as Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and India, offering them a role in shaping a more pluralistic global order.
  2. Strategic signalling to China: Observers noted that Carney’s remarks, alongside references to Canada’s strategic engagement with China, reflect a calibrated approach: cooperation where interests align, combined with efforts to build predictability and trust.
  3. Impact on U.S.–China competition: By urging middle powers to avoid simply reacting to U.S.–China rivalry, Carney reinforced a multi-vector approach already favoured by many Asian countries seeking to balance relations with both powers.

Summary of Geopolitical Implications

Canada: Redefining strategic autonomy, diversifying partnerships, and positioning itself as a coalition leader.
United States: A challenge to unipolar leadership narratives and potential strain on alliances.
Europe: Reinforced concerns over coercive economic tools and momentum towards strategic autonomy.
Asia: Validation of diversified foreign policy strategies and scope for coalition-building beyond the U.S.–China axis.

Looking Ahead

Carney’s speech points towards a future in which rules-based norms can no longer be assumed, middle powers increasingly rely on coalition diplomacy, and global governance becomes more pluralistic. While the address may not immediately reshape policy, it reflects—and may accelerate—a broader recalibration of how influential but non-dominant states view their role in an increasingly uncertain geopolitical environment.

Facebook Comments Box

Continue Reading

Xul

Diblomaasi.com