An open letter calling for conscience, restraint, and the protection of families being removed from their homes and ancestral land.

Your Excellency Hassan Sheikh Mohamud,

I write to you once again, as someone who continues to offer sincere advice, and as one human being speaking to another.

What is unfolding can no longer be described in the language of policy or administration. This is not governance in abstraction—it is the removal of people from the only ground they have ever known, as their homes are taken from beneath them. It is the quiet unravelling of lives built over generations, happening in full view of those who must endure it.

At times, I have tried not to read the reports—not out of indifference, but because each account leaves a weight that does not leave easily. It settles and accumulates. And still, it is impossible to turn away.

It began with government properties being reclaimed. I understood the intent. I told myself it was part of rebuilding a fragile nation—restoring order where disorder had taken root. I tried to see it through the lens of necessity.

But what is happening now no longer fits that explanation.

This is no longer about buildings. It is about families being removed so that the land itself can be reassigned. These are not abstract disputes. These are homes—places where life has quietly accumulated over decades, where memory is not recorded, but lived.

These are places where children grew up, became parents, and grew old on the same ground. Entire generations are anchored in one place. Some who once played in those streets are now elderly, even blind, still holding on to the only world they have ever known.

That continuity is now being broken.

Land is being taken without the consent of those least able to resist or recover. It does more than remove homes; it removes the fragile foundation that makes survival possible. Stability is replaced with exposure. Belonging becomes conditional. What once felt permanent disappears overnight, and what was built across generations becomes something people are told they may no longer keep.

And the human reality is simple and devastating: they are people who cannot begin again. The elderly, who no longer have the strength or time. The children, who cannot understand why their world has been erased. The parents, holding their families together while everything they built is taken in front of them.

This is not only displacement. It is the breaking of continuity itself. And I ask you, sincerely: when you see this, what do you feel?

Because these people are left with nothing. No shelter waiting. No safety net. Only open air, rain, and the remains of what was once their home.

Meanwhile, your family remains in safety, stability, and comfort. That contrast is not distant—it exists in the same moment, under the same sky, within the same country.

Do you ever allow yourself to sit with that—not as information, but as human experience? Because at a certain point, this is no longer about authority. It becomes about what a human heart can carry without closing.

You once placed your hand on the Qur’an and made an oath. That moment was not procedural—it was moral and spiritual. A promise made before ALLAAH and before people.

In the end, everything falls away. Titles do not remain. Positions do not remain. Only what we did with what we were entrusted to protect remains.

There is still time for reflection. What has been taken can be reconsidered. What has been broken can still be acknowledged. What has been done can still be met with restraint instead of continuation.

This is not an appeal to authority. It is an appeal to recognition—to see these people not as obstacles in the way of land, but as human beings whose lives carry the same weight as any other.

Stand, even briefly, in what they are standing in. Feel, even slightly, what they are forced to feel.

Because in the end, that is what remains when everything else is gone.

History will remember this moment. But more immediate than history are the people living through it now—the ones standing in the rain, watching the place they call home disappear in front of their eyes.

And they are still waiting. With sincere concern, Yasmin Ahmed Salad

It remains a confusing situation, but the strait of Hormuz now appears to have been closed twice. Once by Iran, and then by the US, which this week announced a blockade of its own on the reduced number of ships using Iranian ports. Higher fuel and energy costs for ordinary people across the world are the headlines, but as the war on Iran enters its sixth week, shipping restrictions and strikes on energy facilities in Gulf countries are affecting some of the poorest and most vulnerable economies in the world in more profound ways.

I spoke to Dr. Zainab Usman, senior research scholar at the Centre on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University, about how the war and its blockades are affecting some African countries.

A global shock

“It’s very important”, Dr Usman stresses, “to understand that while the obstruction of shipping has affected the entire world, that particular choke point” in the Middle East, “accounts for 20% of the world’s shipment of crude oil, and a good chunk of that goes to Asia and parts of east Africa.” And so, it is countries closer to the strait and the Indian Ocean that have been affected the most. Ethiopia, Kenya, Egypt, and some parts of southern Africa, are already experiencing fuel shortages. Countries facing the Atlantic Ocean on the west coast of Africa have not suffered from similar supply disruptions. However, a hike in fuel prices is landing across the continent. Costs have risen, Dr Usman told me, anywhere between 30 and 70%, and at the most extreme end, up to 150% in Somalia.

But there is another distinction that means the impact of the war is more severe for some.

Oil importers hit hardest

“I would divide African countries broadly into two categories”, Dr Usman said. “One would be oil-importing countries in the east and some parts of north and southern Africa. And then those that are oil-producing countries,” such as Nigeria, Angola, Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville. The former import all the oil they consume, and are doubly affected if their supplies come through the Gulf. Egypt, for example, has already passed energy saving measures reducing street lighting, and passed a decree stipulating that shops, restaurants, shopping centres, cinemas, theatres, and wedding halls shut down at 9pm to save electricity.

But oil-exporting countries, Dr Usman said, are “still not immune from the crisis”. They are being affected not through supply shortages, but the general global hike in fuel prices brought about by the political shock from events in the Middle East. Nigeria has one of the largest oil refineries in the world but people are still paying more for fuel. “The interesting thing about rising energy costs around the world is they have inflationary impacts,” Dr Usman said. Energy is needed for daily activities: for electricity, for fuel for your car. In the immediate term, “the impact is quite hurtful to households, businesses, and the budgets of governments”.

A food crisis is not inevitable

There is a tendency, she tells me, that where poorer countries are concerned, to catastrophise. There is a global shock and immediately people “start projecting disaster, famine, hunger. We did this during the early days of the war in Ukraine. There were challenges in getting certain oils and grains, but projections of widespread hunger did not pan out. There are nuances to take into account”. (This point reminds me of how the Covid-19 pandemic was less deadly in Africa than anticipated, and in fact, less severe compared to places with more advanced health systems).

The strait handles the shipment of supplies for commodities beyond oil and fuels, with fertiliser among the key resources passing through the shipping lane. But the impact of fertiliser shortages on Africa is, at the moment, overestimated, Dr Usman said. “Unlike the immediate impact of reduction of fuel supplies, the use of fertiliser is seasonal and just because there’s a disruption now doesn’t mean that farming and harvesting and output is affected. A lot of poor countries in Africa and elsewhere tend to have economies that are heavily agricultural”, and so “they do take storage seriously”. Even if this conflict becomes prolonged, some countries will be able to tap into the supplies they have stored. “I would be cautious,” Dr Usman said, in projecting food insecurity.

Rising risks and opportunities

“If this conflict becomes prolonged, then we are looking at deeper impacts on African economies,” Dr Usman said. One would be that governments will start thinking about cushioning the higher prices across the board that arise from higher energy costs, and so would raise subsidies. “Subsidies are quite expensive and would put a strain on budgets,” Dr Usman said.

If the conflict continues we could begin to see a disruption in supplies, even in countries that are oil-rich. “You have to remember that some of these countries don’t have sufficient refining capacity to convert the crude oil they extract into the refined products used daily. They will then have to supplement their domestic production with imports. That is the case in quite a number of countries in west and central Africa.”

But there is a third, longer-term implication that is not necessarily a negative. “Many countries now realise that energy security should be top of mind for them. Before this crisis, energy policy was mostly around how do we make electricity affordable, reliable, accessible, with energy procured from clean sources that do not add to greenhouse gas emissions. Now, many policymakers, are rightly in my view, going to focus on energy security that looks beyond developmental goals. We have to think in realpolitik terms – how do we ensure vulnerability to external shocks and things we cannot control.” This may mean an orientation towards African countries “harnessing their own domestic resources”, and investing in their regional refining and processing capacity.

Hostages to peace

But a final implication still lurks in the background. If the conflict and shipping constraints continue, stores of fertiliser run out, and the farming season is afoot, there is risk of weaker harvests and poor availability of food.

But “we are not there yet”, Dr Usman said. Which is an apt summary of how the Middle East crisis is splitting those it affects into two – those for whom the impact has already arrived, and those who are not there yet, hostage to a de-escalation that is always imminent, but never seems to arrive.

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Nesrine Malik is a Guardian columnist and the author of We Need New Stories: Challenging the Toxic Myths Behind Our Age of Discontent

The appointment of James Swan to lead the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) comes at a particularly challenging moment for the country. The mission faces significant political, security, and operational pressures that require experienced diplomatic leadership and careful coordination among national, regional, and international actors.

1. Escalating Conflict in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo—particularly North Kivu and Ituri provinces—remains one of the most volatile regions in Africa. The area continues to experience persistent armed group activity, widespread civilian displacement, and growing cross‑border tensions. One of the most prominent actors is the March 23 Movement (M23), a rebel group that has re‑emerged as a major security threat in recent years. Clashes between M23 and Congolese government forces have intensified, further complicating relations with neighboring Rwanda and Uganda, both of which are frequently accused of involvement or influence in the conflict.

2. Proliferation of Armed Groups

Eastern DRC hosts more than one hundred armed groups operating across different territories. Among the most prominent are the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which has been linked to extremist networks and is responsible for numerous attacks on civilians, and the Cooperative for the Development of the Congo (CODECO), which is primarily active in Ituri province. These groups engage in massacres, kidnappings, and illegal exploitation of natural resources, including mining and cross‑border smuggling. Managing such a complex security environment requires close coordination between MONUSCO, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), and regional partners.

The appointment of James Swan to lead the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) comes at a particularly challenging moment for the country.

3. Rising Public and Political Pressure on MONUSCO

Despite being one of the largest peacekeeping missions in the world, MONUSCO has faced increasing criticism within the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Segments of the Congolese public and political leadership argue that the mission has not sufficiently curbed violence in the east and has remained in the country for too long. Public demonstrations and attacks targeting UN facilities have occurred in cities such as Goma. A key challenge for the mission’s leadership will therefore be rebuilding public confidence while managing expectations surrounding the future of the UN presence.

4. Planned Drawdown of the Mission

The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has requested a phased withdrawal of MONUSCO. This creates a delicate balance: the mission must transition responsibly while security conditions remain fragile. Effective coordination with FARDC and other security actors will be essential to ensure that the drawdown does not create security vacuums that could further destabilize the region.

5. Regional Diplomatic Tensions

The conflict in eastern DRC has increasingly taken on a regional dimension, involving neighboring states and multiple diplomatic initiatives. Two mediation frameworks are particularly significant: initiatives led by the East African Community and parallel diplomatic and security efforts associated with the Southern African Development Community. Managing relations among these actors requires careful diplomacy and sustained regional engagement.

Why Swan’s Experience Matters

James Swan’s previous leadership roles in Somalia—including his work with the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the United Nations Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS)—have involved managing complex political transitions and fragile security environments. This experience is likely viewed as valuable for navigating the operational transition at MONUSCO, coordinating regional diplomacy, and guiding the mission during a period of heightened political sensitivity.

Conclusion, MONUSCO currently faces three simultaneous pressures: continued armed conflict in eastern Congo, growing domestic demands for the mission’s withdrawal, and rising regional diplomatic tensions. Together, these challenges underscore why the United Nations has appointed an experienced envoy to lead the mission during this critical period.

Many diplomats believe that the United Nations may appoint an African envoy to succeed James Swan as Special Representative for Somalia. This expectation reflects evolving regional politics, questions of legitimacy, and the changing role of the UN mission in the country. Several political considerations are commonly cited in diplomatic discussions.

1. Growing Calls for African Leadership in African Conflicts

African governments and regional organizations have increasingly emphasized that African crises should be addressed through African leadership. Institutions such as the African Union have consistently advocated for stronger African ownership of peace processes and greater regional responsibility for security decisions.

Appointing an African envoy to Somalia would signal support for African‑led solutions and reinforce the principle that regional actors should play a central role in resolving conflicts on the continent.

2. Enhancing Legitimacy with Somali Stakeholders

Somalia’s political environment remains highly sensitive to issues of sovereignty and external influence. At times, Somali political figures and civil society groups have expressed concern that international envoys may appear overly involved in domestic political matters or aligned with external political priorities.

An envoy from Africa may therefore be perceived as more culturally and politically aligned with regional perspectives and less associated with broader geopolitical agendas. This perception could help strengthen trust between the UN mission and Somali stakeholders.

3. The Expanding Role of the African Union in Somalia

Security operations in Somalia are increasingly led by African forces. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was later replaced by the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), and further adjustments to the mission structure are expected as the African Union continues to expand its leadership role.

As a result, coordination between the United Nations and the African Union is becoming even more important. An African envoy could help reinforce this partnership and facilitate closer institutional cooperation.

4. Transition from UNSOM to UNTMIS

The United Nations presence in Somalia is also evolving. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) is transitioning toward a new structure, the United Nations Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS).

This shift reflects a broader effort to gradually reduce the UN’s direct political footprint as Somali institutions assume greater responsibility. Appointing an African diplomat could help frame this transition as a process of regional empowerment rather than international disengagement.

5. Managing Geopolitical Interests

Somalia has become strategically significant for several international actors, including the United States, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and China. With multiple external powers involved, the selection of an African envoy could help reinforce the UN’s image as a neutral facilitator rather than an actor aligned with any particular geopolitical bloc.

Conclusion, selecting an African envoy for Somalia would reflect a broader diplomatic trend toward strengthening regional leadership in conflict management across Africa, while positioning the United Nations in a supportive and coordinating role.

Over the past decade, Somalia has made significant progress in rebuilding its governance structures, strengthening federal institutions, and re‑establishing the rule of law after decades of conflict. International partners have invested substantial financial, technical, and diplomatic resources to support these efforts, with the shared objective of building a stable, democratic, and accountable Somali state.

However, as of 4 March 2026, Somalia faces a serious constitutional and political challenge that risks undermining these hard‑won gains. Reports suggest that steps are being taken to replace the Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia (2012), the framework that established the federal system, defined the distribution of powers between the Federal Government and Federal Member States, and reflected negotiated agreements among clans, civil society, and Somali citizens. Although provisional, this constitution has served as the cornerstone of Somalia’s fragile stability and political reconciliation.

Any attempt to replace or substantially alter the constitution without broad consultation and established legal procedures could have significant consequences:

– Undermining federalism: Federal Member States may view such actions as a challenge to their constitutional authority and autonomy.
– Weakening the rule of law: If constitutional processes are bypassed, government decisions may be perceived as arbitrary, eroding trust in public institutions.
– Eroding public confidence: Somali citizens may begin to question the legitimacy of governance structures, potentially destabilizing the broader political environment.

These risks are further compounded by the absence of a fully operational Constitutional Court. Without an independent judicial body capable of adjudicating constitutional disputes, disagreements over governance arrangements may escalate into political conflicts, deepening divisions at a sensitive moment in Somalia’s development.

Recommended Actions for International Partners

The international community, including the United Nations, diplomatic missions, and development partners, can play a constructive role in helping mitigate these risks:

1. Encourage inclusive consultation: Any constitutional review or amendment process should involve Federal Member States, Parliament, civil society, traditional elders, religious leaders, and other key stakeholders.

2. Reaffirm the rule of law: International partners should emphasize that constitutional reform must follow established legal procedures and respect the principle of legality.

3. Support institutional development: Continued support for the establishment of an independent judiciary, including a fully functioning Constitutional Court, is essential to ensure fair and credible dispute resolution.

4. Promote transparency and public engagement: Public consultation, open communication, and citizen participation are critical to legitimizing any constitutional process.

Somalia stands at a pivotal moment. The decisions taken now will determine whether the country strengthens its federal system, reinforces the rule of law, and advances national unity, or risks a path toward unilateral governance, weakened institutions, and political fragmentation.

Constructive engagement from the international community remains essential. By encouraging inclusive, transparent, and legally grounded constitutional processes, international partners can help ensure that Somalia’s governance reflects national consensus, protects federalism, and safeguards the progress achieved by the Somali people over the past decade.